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1. Introduction
In many countries there is a tendency to give the workers or
representatives of the workers a role in the management of
the firms they are working in. It has been shown that if wor-
kerscollectives pursue the objective of maximization of the
netincome per worker this would not distort the efficient
allocation of scarce resources in the economy. (1); (2); (3).
The models used by these authors do not distinguish capital
goods with respect to ownership. It should be clear however
that at least for a definite transition period it can be ex-
pected that full workers-management has to start in an environ-
ment where private capital still plays an important role. Mean-
while a stock of social capital goods has to be build up if
one wants to enlarge the self-managed sector in the economy.
It is the purpose of this paper to study economic growth and
stability of economic growth during a transition period. By
transition period we mean the period in which all firms are
actually maneged by workerscollectives or their representa-
tives. It is assumed that all these firms try to maximize
net-income per worker. In the production proces they all use
the private and the social capital good. Although the social
capital good and the private capital good should be defined
legally, for the purpose of economic analysis it is sufficient
to distinguish between them by the different ways they are
generated. It is assumed that the private capital good is
financed through the savings of private capital-owners. They
save all their income. The social capital good is forthcoming
through imposing taxes on economic agents. This will raise the
question of designing an optimal tax structure and the problem
of determining the optimal tax rates. Furthermore it is assumed
that an economy incurs transformation costs during such an
transition period.
Those costs can appear in many forms e.g. educational expenses
to increase decision-making skills of the workers in the eco-
nomy or the organizational costs in production. It is investi-
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gated how the transformation costs might influence the tax
program and the level of the tax rates in the transition period.
In section 2 a model will be developed in the context of which
the above mentioned problems can be analyzed, while section 3
proposes an optimal tax policy for the transition period.
Concluding remarks can be found in section 4.
- 3 -
2. The model
The frame work in which economic growth and stability of eco-
nomic growth in the transition period will be analyzed is the
neo-classical growth model for an aggregate closed economy.
This means that the economy produces a single homogeneous
good, the output of which at time t is X(t), using three homo-
geneous factor inputs, labor L(t), the private capital good
Kp(t) and the social capital good Ks(t). By closed we mean that
imports and exports are ignored. Therefore all output is either
consumed or invested in the economy, giving the income iden-
tity:
X(t) - C(t) f Ip(t) t Is(t) (1)
Dividing both sides by X(t) reveals the fact that for each t,
I I
X t~ f Xs - 1 (2)
giving the transformationplane ABC in fig. 1. This transfor-
mationplane is the set of all conceivable average consumption
ratio's and investment ratio's for each t. Since this paper
only investigates the effects of creating a social capital
good in the economy it is assumed that changing the consum-
tion~private investment ratio is costless while increasing
the social capital~private capital ratio causes transformation
costs, being the vertical distance between the original trans-
formationplane ABC and the transformationplane ABD for each
consumption~private investment ratio. The shape of the trans-
formationplane ABD reflects the assumption of increasing trans-
formation costs in choosing higher investments in social capi-
tal. One can conceive of these transformation costs as the
educational costs involved in introducing organizational struc-
tures for labor-management in the exísting firms in the economy.
Another way of looking at the increasing transformation costs
is to assume that private capital owners are more reluctant
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to give up management prerogatives the higher social capital~
private capital ratio's are. This reluctance can be taken away
by paying them a sort of bonus for giving up their management-
rights. If one chooses the latter interpretation one need not
assume that capitalist do not consume as is usually done in
this type of models.
Proceeding with the development of the model gross investments
in the private capital good and the social capital good are
defined as:
dK (t)
Ip(t) - dPt f upKp(t)
dK (t)
Is(t) - dst f usKs(t)
(3)
(4)
where up and us are the depreciation rates for the private
capital good and the social capital good respectively.
Gross investments in social capital are, however, dependent
upon the level of national output X(t), the consumption level
C(t) and the gross investments in the private capital good
Ip(t).
Or, equivalently, since for each consumption~private invest-
ment ratio the transformation costs are specified they are a
function of the level of national output X(t) and the level
of transformation costs TC(t).
dK (t)
IS(t) - dst f uSKs(t) - G(X(t), C(t), Ip(t)) -
- F(TC(t), X(t)) (5)
If lineair homogenity is assumed (5) can be written as:
I (t) - X(t),H(TC(t))s X(t) (6)
Assuming that all private savings Sp(t) are invested in the
private capital good and that the transformation costs are
covered by collecting the scarcity rent for the social capital
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good, labor-income tax Tl(t), private capital income tax Tp(t)
and sales tax Ts(t) we have:
Ip(t) - Sp(t)




where Pk is the price of social capital deflated by the price
level P Sx
Private savings are equal to the disposable income of owners
of private capital:
Sp(t) - (1-tp)Pk Kp(t)
P
(93
where tp is the tax rate ~n private capital income and Pk
is the real price of private capital. P
The tax generated by taxing the income of workers equals
Tl(t) - tl.y.L(t) (10)
tl is the tax rate on labor income and y is the real net-income
per worker.
Profit tax is eaual to:
Tp(t) - tp.Pk .Kp(t)
P
while sales tax can be defined as:
Ts(t) - ts.X(t) (12)
in which ts is the sales tax rate. For consumption will be
left:
C1(t) - (1-tl).y.L(t) (13)
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The individual labor-managed firm in the economy faces the
following constrained maximization problem for each t:
Px(1-ts)Xi(t)-Pk .iKs(t)-Pk .iKp(t)
max. yi - L(t) p (14)i
iL'iKp'iKs
S.T. Xi - iLa.iKP.iKs for all 1 (i-1,2,...,n) (15)
In the long run the net-income per worker in the individual









Since (15) is lineair homogeneous and if we assume that the
economy consists of n identical firms we can simply multiply
(14) by n giving the same long run decision rules on the
macro level. If reference is made to the macro interpretation
the subscript i will be left out in equations (14)-(18).
By (16)-(18) long term factor incomes will be known thus by
using (9) and (17) private savings for each t can be calculated:
Sp(t) - (1-tp)(1-ts)RX(t) (19)
and by using (8), (10)-(12) and (16), (18) the transformation
costs for each t can be found:
TC(t) - {(atltStpfY)(1-ts)fts} X(t) (20)
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Consumption for each t will then be, substituting (16) in (13):
C1(t) - (1-tl)(1-ts)aX(t)
It can be checked that for each t:
X(t) - C(t) t Sp(t) t TC(t)
(21)
(22)
For the purpose of continuing in per worker quantities the
following definitions are needed:
dKp(t)
d t - Ip(t)
K (t)




d t - Is(t)
Ks ( t)
L t) - ks(t)
C1(t)
L(t - c (t)
L
L - n- L
(23)
If it is assumed that all private savings go into private
investments by using (3) and (19) private investments per
worker are:
dK (t)
Ip(t) dpt K (t) X(t)
L(t) - L(t) } Up ~~ - (1-tp)(1-ts)RL(t) (24)
From (4), (6) and (20) social capital investments per worker
are obtained:
Is(t) d t




Given the definitions in (23) and derivíng:
dK




kp - át( L t)) - L2 - L L L
dK
~
dt - jt t nkL p p (26)
Going through the same derivation for the social capital good:
dKs
dt - k f nkL s s (27)
Substituting (26) and (27) in (24) and (25) respectively:
kp t (nfup)kp - (1-tp)(1-ts)(3x(t) (28)
ks f (nfus)ks - H[ (atlfBtptY) (1-ts)tts]x(t) (29)
Because the production function (15) is lineair homogeneous
it can be written as: x- kP.ks so that after dividing (28)
and (29) by kp and ks respectively the following system of
differential equations can be obtained:
k
~ - (1-tp)(1-ts)BkP-l.ks - (ntup)
P
(30)
ks - HI (atlfBtptY) (1-ts)fts] kP.ks-i-(~rtus) (31)
s
Balanced economic growth requires a net growth rate for the
private capital stock and the social capital stock equal to
the natural rate of growth ~r. This condition is satisfied
if capítal~labor ratio's have reached their long run equili-
brium values. Thus this condition implies kp - ks - 0.




being a function increasing at a decreasing rate since
dk k
~ - -i ~
dks 1 - R ks
and:
(1-ts)(1-t )S 1-s 1-S
kp - (~rfup 'ks
k -
P (nfus) I 'ks
being a function increasing at an increasing rate since
dk 1 k 1
ák - S Y~~ and s ~ 1 as drawn in fig. 2.S S
(32)
(33)
By varying around k- 0 and. ks - O in (30) and (31) the be-P
hav;our of the capital~labor ratio's can be studied if they
are not on the balanced growth path. Four regions can be
distinguished marked by the four pairs of arrows indicating
the four possibilities of the equilibrium growth path: increase
or decrease in both ratio's on the one hand and increase in
the social capital~labor ratio and decrease in the private
capital~labor ratio or vice versa on the other hand. Since in
the four relevant intersections in fig. 2 the arrows have the
appropriate direction for stability the point where the two
points intersect is stable. Now stability is guaranteed solving








~N[ (atltRtpfY) (1-ts} fts]~ - R S
s
a








(nfu ) a a a
kP - p Y . (1-tp)(1-ts)S HI(atl}RtptY)(1-ts)ftsl
(~rfus) a
(35)
As can been seen from (34) and (35) the balanced growth capital
labor ratio's are dependent upon the long run tax program ts,
tp and tl and the level of these tax rates. Dioreover both
ratio's are influenced by the increasing costs of transforma-
tion through H[.]. The implications of these dependencies will
be investigated in more detail in the next section.
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3. Transformation costs and tax policy
If during the transition period a national goal of maximizing
consumption per worker is pursued one has to choose the in-
dependent variables entering that objective function such that
a true maximum is obtained. From (21) and (23) we have:
c(t) - (1-tl)(1-ts)a x(t) (36)
But using (15) and the long run equilibríum capital~labor
ratio's of (34) and (35) it can be seen that the consumption
per worker is dependent upon the transformation costs through
the H[.] function and upon the tax policy through the choice
and level of tax rates.
Y
(~rtus)a




~ ~(1-tp) (1-ts) R ~H[ (atlfStpfY) (1-ts)ftsJ (37)
The problem is to choose those taxes of the tax program that
will reflect the role of transformation costs during the
transition period directly and those levels of sales tax ts,
tax on private capital income tp and tax on labor income tl
that will maximize consumption per worker in the economy.
Putting the partial derivatives with respect to ts, tp and tl
in (37) equal to zero the following conditions are obtained:
á(1-tl)E - (atlfBtptY)(1-ts) f ts
a}S(1-ts)E - (atltstpfY)(1-ts} f ts





in which E is the elasticity of transformation defined as:
~
E-(atltBtpfY)(1-ts) f ts H 0 ~ E ~ 1 (41)
(38)-(40) can be summarized as:
1-tl - 1-ts - 1-tP
a - ats R (42)
Apperently E does not play a role in determining the optimal
tax rates for the three taxes. Moreover it appears that the
three equations cannot be solved simultaneously since they
are not independent. Let therefore the sales tax be determined
exogeneously from the interval 0 ~ ts ~ 1, then from (42} we
obtain:
a atl -(1-afs) } a f 8 ts
tp -(1-ass) } a S R ts
(43)
(44)
Fig. 3 shows that if a sales tax rate is chosen from the in-
terval (0,1) the tax rate on private capital income ánd the
tax rate on labor income are determined simultaneously; the
former from the interval (1-ass, 1), the latter from the in-
terval (1-aas, 1). For each ts the optimal tax rates for labor
is smaller than the optimal tax rate for capitalists. Moreover
in determining the optimal tax rates on private capital income
and labor income the limits and the actual values are completely
determined by the elasticity of output with respect to labor
(a) and the elasticity of output with respect to the private
capital good (S).
One of the shortcomings of the tax-structure chosen above is
the cutting off of the relationship between transformation
costs and the tax rates.
If one wants to reflect the increasing transformation costs








make use of the sales tax instrument. To show this the model
developped in section 2 is changed such that the consumption
per worker will be:
Y ~ Y
(~rfu ) a a a
c(t) -(1-tl)a s R R(1-tp) H(atlfRtpfY) (45)
(~rfup) a
Pursuing long run maximization of consumption per worker im-
plies choosing such values for tl and tp that St - át - 0.
1
This will give the following set of conditions:








In this case the optimal tax rates ean be solved directly
from (46) and (47):
t~ - a(a-R) f Y(E-R)
P YE t a2 t R2
t ~ 1
P
t~ --S(a-R) f Y(E-a) t ~ 1




The question rises if tp and tl will be greater than zero.
This will only be the case when the following two conditions
hold simultaneously:
tp ~ 0 p aZ t SZ ~ R- YE
tl ~ 0 q aZ f RZ ~ a- YE
If e.g. the elasticity of transformation is very low (E - 0),
implying very high marginal transformation costs, and a-.6,
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S-.3 and y-.1 only the tax rate on capital income is posi-
tive whereas the tax rate on labor income is negative. This
means subsidies for the workers during the period in which
they have to learn and actually manage the enterprises in the
economy.
By differentiating (48) and (49) with respect to E it is clear
that
st
á ~ 0 and
atl
aE ~ 0
This implies that increasing transformation costs in the proces
of choosing higher social capital investment quota's and lower
private capital investment quota's require lower tax rates on
private capital income and labor income.
Since the optimal tax rates determine the eguilibrium capital~
labor ratio's in (32) and (33) it can be seen that an increased
tax rate on private capital income and labor income (given
ts - 0) will shift both curves downward as shown in fig. 4.
This means that through higher transformation costs and an
appropriate tax program it is possible to increase gradually
the social capital~labor ratio while decreasing the role of
the private capital good in the economy in the meantime remain-








This paper investigated the creation of a social capital good
in a labor-managed economy. It was assumed that the transfor-
mation proces required transformation costs, e.g. educational
costs for teaching workers self-management or costs involved
in introducing self-management structures in the organization
of the enterpríses. Besides the social capital good there
remained the role of the private capital good in the labor
-managed economy. In the context of a neo-classical growth
model it was specified how both capital goods were forthcoming.
More specifically the social capital good was created through
taxation of the economic agents and the private capital good
through savings of the owners of private capital. It is shown
that through increasing educational efforts the economy can
adopt a growing influence of the social capital good. P. well
designed tax program is necessary though. One should not make
use of a sales tax if a direct relationship between transfor-
mation costs and a higher social capital~labor ratio is to be
preserved in the economy.
One can confine oneself to a tax on private capital income
and labor income alone in that case provided that the possí-
bility of subsidizing the labors during the transformation
period is not ruled out. This additional labor income could
be seen as a renumeration for the input of enterpreneurial
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